On Ricœur’s Shift from a Hermeneutics of Culture to a Cultural Hermeneutics by Adams, Suzi
 Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, Vol 6, No 2 (2015), pp. 130-153 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2015.312 
http://ricoeur.pitt.edu 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 
United States License. 
 
This journal is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its 
D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
On Ricœur’s Shift from a Hermeneutics of Culture to a Cultural 
Hermeneutics  
Suzi Adams 
Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Flinders University (Adelaide) 
Abstract: 
The essay’s argument is twofold: First, it contends that Ricœur’s articulation of the social imaginary in the 
Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (and other essays of that period), reveals a turn to a general theory of culture, 
which is best understood as a shift from a hermeneutics of culture to a cultural hermeneutics. This move forms 
part of his philosophical anthropology of “real social life.” The essay proposes it is epitomized in Ricœur’s 
changing reception of Cassirer. Second, the essay hermeneutically reconstructs the emergence of this turn in 
Ricœur’s intellectual trajectory, and, in so doing, contends that it is connected to a rearticulation of both the 
phenomenological reduction and the symbolic function that took place in the mid- to late 1960s. Ricœur’s 
developing response to the phenomenological problematic of the world horizon underlies these further 
phenomenological-hermeneutic considerations. The essay concludes with a brief sketch of Ricœur’s 
understanding of the symbolic mediation of action (in the Geertz lecture) as a reconfiguration of the 
hermeneutical actualization of phenomenological preconditions of the symbolic. 
Keywords: Paul Ricœur, Cultural Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Social Imaginary, World Horizon, the Symbolic, the 
Human Condition. 
Résumé: 
L’argument de cet essai est double: il soutient d’abord que la conception de l’imaginaire social présentée par 
Ricœur dans Idéologie et utopie (ainsi que dans d’autres essais de cette période) révèle un tournant en 
direction d’une théorie générale de la culture, qui se comprend mieux comme le passage d’une 
herméneutique de la culture à une herméneutique culturelle. Ce changement de perspective est constitutif de 
l’anthropologie philosophique ricœurienne de la “vie sociale réelle” et cet article défend l’idée selon laquelle 
il se résume lui-même dans l’évolution de la réception de Cassirer dans l’œuvre de Ricœur. Dans un second 
temps, cet essai reconstruit ensuite de manière herméneutique l’émergence de ce tournant dans la trajectoire 
intellectuelle de Ricœur, et, ce faisant, soutient l’idée selon laquelle il est lié à une réarticulation de la 
réduction phénoménologique et de la fonction symbolique élaborée dans la deuxième moitié des années 
1960. La réponse progressive de Ricœur à la problématique phénoménologique de l’horizon du monde est à 
la base de ces nouvelles considérations phénoménologiques et herméneutiques. Cet article  se conclut sur un 
bref exposé de la conception ricœurienne de la médiation symbolique de l’action (dans sa lecture de Geertz), 
comme reconfiguration de l’actualisation herméneutique des conditions phénoménologiques préalables du 
symbolique. 
Mots-clés: Paul Ricœur, herméneutique culturelle, phénoménologie, imaginaire social, horizon mondial, le symbolique, 
l’humaine condition. 
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In his “Editor’s Introduction” to Paul Ricœur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, George 
H. Taylor proposes that “the larger project to which the lectures belong is best characterized not 
simply as philosophic but as philosophical anthropological.”1 The question of philosophical 
anthropology was of enduring concern to Ricœur, and his later anthropology evinces a change in 
emphasis from the “fallible” or “culpable” human to the “capable” human.2 The philosophical 
anthropology at work in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, however, is different: its focus is the 
social, cultural and political dimensions of the imagination, and of the human condition, more 
generally. Thus, the philosophical anthropology that appears in the Lectures is better 
characterized as an anthropology of “real social life”; this is a term that Ricœur takes from Marx 
but uses to turn Marx on his head.3 Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology of “real social life” 
emerges from his elucidation of the social imaginary; more particularly, it arises from his 
discussion of the ideological imaginary. His emphasis on the practical sphere of social life is 
integral to this approach. For Ricœur, it is characterized by “praxis” (following Marx) or “social 
action” (following Weber); he considers it to comprise the object proper to the social sciences. As 
is well known, the lectures on ideology culminate with the discussion of Geertz’s work.4 Here 
Ricœur’s argument is twofold: first, that social action is mediated by symbolic systems; and, 
second, that these symbolic systems are the manifestation of ideology in its most elementary layer 
of “integration” (not “distortion”). As social integration, the ideological imaginary is inescapably 
symbolic. As Ricœur tells us, “[t]he ideological dimension is grafted onto a symbolic function. Only 
because the structure of human social life is already symbolic can it be distorted.”5  
Through hermeneutical reconstruction of key texts – where the object of reflection is the 
text itself (and its layers of meaning) and not the author’s erstwhile intentions – I argue that 
Ricœur’s work reveals that the symbolic function culturally configures social life (considered as a 
whole). Social life (and its cultural configuration) is to be grasped as always-already 
incorporating a trans-subjective aspect that is irreducible to intersubjective contexts (I return to 
this). The notion of the symbolic function as the key structuring – or figuring – element of the 
human condition writ large represents, furthermore, a significant shift in Ricœur’s thought. It is 
best understood as a move to a general theory of culture, where he came to understand cultural 
meaning as the more or less autonomous basis of social life. With this change, Ricœur deepens 
both the hermeneutical turn that emerged most clearly in the Symbolism of Evil,6 and his ongoing 
articulation of the “co-belonging” of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Thus his move to a 
general theory of culture remains both phenomenological and hermeneutical, although Ricœur 
also emphasizes different elements of the interplay of their co-belonging over the course of his 
intellectual trajectory.7 More particularly, within Ricœur’s overall conception of the co-belonging 
of phenomenology and hermeneutics, this essay focuses on a particular episode that begins in the 
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mid- late 1960s, and involves a new departure in the reflection on culture. For that reason, a 
certain re-enhancement of phenomenology occurs because of the rearticulated emphasis on 
subject, meaning and world, on the one hand, while the reach of hermeneutics was extended into 
the practical domain of social action, on the other.8 
Ricœur’s move to a general theory of culture (as part of his expanded philosophical 
anthropology) can be understood to articulate a cultural phenomenological-hermeneutics that 
emphasizes practical life as action.9 Visible in his thought from the late 1960s, it matured by the 
mid-1970s as evident with his work on the social imaginary and metaphor, as well as sustained 
reflection on the imagination, more generally. The richest articulation of this cultural 
philosophical anthropology is found in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, but Ricœur continues 
to refine it further – in some aspects at least – in Time and Narrative in the early 1980s, and beyond. 
In order to advance this interpretation of Ricœur’s project, hermeneutical reconstruction selected 
aspects of his intellectual trajectory is called for. The scope of the enquiry spans the period from 
the mid-late 1960s (beginning with the essay, “The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of 
Semiology”) to 1980 (finishing with his review of Nelson Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking).10 I 
have said that this essay attempts to articulate Ricœur’s shift from a hermeneutics of culture, to a 
cultural hermeneutics of the symbolic as part of an expanded philosophical anthropology of the 
practical sphere of social life. “Cultural hermeneutics” refers to various approaches in the human 
sciences which take seriously the interpretation of cultural meaning as not only fundamental to 
the human condition but also as working more or less autonomously. Not all versions of cultural 
hermeneutics, however, incorporate a phenomenological element: Jeffrey C. Alexander’s 
sociological approach is a prime example in this regard. Conversely, some thinkers who do 
develop a cultural hermeneutic framework in dialogue with phenomenology have looked to 
classical sociology – such as the Weberian tradition – for resources to articulate the hermeneutic 
element of culture without significant recourse to philosophical hermeneutics: Johann 
P. Arnason’s social theory epitomizes the latter approach. In Ricœur’s case the ongoing interplay 
between phenomenology and hermeneutics was crucial to his overall intellectual project, in 
general, and to his rethinking of culture, in particular. 
The impetus for this essay was animated by reflections on Ricœur’s changing reception of 
Cassirer’s symbolic forms (and the symbolic). Although Ricœur did not systematically discuss 
Cassirer, his place in Ricœur’s trajectory seemed to be emblematic of larger, more latent 
tendencies in Ricœur’s thought that were worth investigating further.11 The first part of this essay 
thus briefly outlines Ricœur’s engagement with Cassirer, and sketches the implications of culture 
considered as an autonomous aspect of society. The second section considers Ricœur’s renewed 
articulation of the phenomenological reduction in relation to the symbolic function. The final part 
of the essay moves to the hermeneutical plane properly speaking, but remains sensitive to the 
ongoing interplay of phenomenology and hermeneutics in his thought.  
1. Cassirer, Geertz, and the Autonomy of Culture  
Ricœur’s best known remarks on Cassirer are found in Freud and Philosophy.12 Here 
Ricœur distinguishes his own approach to symbolism from Aristotle’s overly narrow approach, 
on the one hand, and Cassirer’s excessively broad notion, on the other. As Ricœur tells us, for 
 On Ricœur’s Shift from a Hermeneutics of Culture to a Culture of Hermeneutics 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 6, No 2 (2015)    ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2015.312    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
132 
 
Cassirer, “‘the symbolic’ designates the common denominator of all the ways of objectivizing, of 
giving meaning to reality.”13 Although Ricœur agrees with Cassirer that the place of symbols in 
human life indicates “above all” the non-immediacy of our grasp of reality, at that period in his 
thought, he concluded that the notion of “sign” or “signifying function” would be a better term 
for the all-encompassing domain of the “symbolic” that Cassirer articulates. At stake for Ricœur 
was the “specificity of the hermeneutic problem.”14 Cassirer’s approach expanded the notion of 
“the symbolic” to that of “reality” and “culture,” tout court. In so doing, Cassirer erased a 
distinction that Ricœur considered central for hermeneutics at that time: the demarcation 
between univocity and plurivocity. On Ricœur’s account, the plurivocity of meaning as the 
double intentionality of the symbol that simultaneously conceals as it reveals – was basic to the 
hermeneutic endeavour. In this vein, he wrote:  
If we use the term symbolic for the signifying function in its entirety, we no longer have a 
word to designate the group of signs whose intentional texture calls for a reading of 
another meaning in the first, literal, and immediate meaning. […] i.e. an interpretation, in 
the precise sense of the word. To mean something other than what is said – this is the 
symbolic function.15 
Ricœur’s next mention of Cassirer occurs in a more indirect context. In The Rule of 
Metaphor Ricœur noted that Nelson Goodman had critically appropriated Cassirer’s 
understanding of the symbolic as “signification in general.”16 Ricœur also mentions Goodman’s 
engagement with Cassirer a few years later in his review of Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking.17 (I 
return to a discussion of Goodman later in the essay.) By the early 1980s, however, Ricœur’s 
approach to Cassirer had undergone a remarkable shift, as seen in his discussion in Time and 
Narrative 1 on “Mimesis 1”: The focus here is the “pre-understanding of the world of action” – i.e. 
the practical realm of social life.18 In this context, Ricœur observes that: 
[I]f imitating is elaborating an articulated significance of some action, a supplementary 
competence is required: an aptitude for identifying what I call the symbolic mediations of 
action, in a sense of the world “symbol” that Cassirer made classic and that cultural 
anthropology, from which I shall draw several examples, adopted.19 
Let us note the lack of fanfare with which his new agreement with Cassirer is announced. 
Let us also note that he would seem to link it to an engagement with cultural anthropology, 
which, in Ricœur’s case, meant the work of Clifford Geertz. Indeed, just three pages later, in 
discussing the symbolic resources of practical life, Ricœur begins his engagement with Geertz. He 
again provides different definitions of “the symbol” (and again notes his agreement with 
Cassirer). He tells us that:  
Between too poor and too rich an acceptation, I have opted for [a definition of “symbol”] 
close to that of Cassirer, in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in as much as, for him, 
symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience. If I speak more precisely 
of symbolic mediation, it is to distinguish, among symbols of a cultural nature, the ones 
that underlie action and that constitute its first signification, before autonomous symbolic 
whole dependent upon speaking or writing become detached from the practical level. In 
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this sense we might speak of an implicit or immanent symbolism, in opposition to an 
explicit or autonomous one.20  
In this vein we might ask: what is the significance of cultural anthropology? So called 
cultural anthropology began to emerge with Franz Boas at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
blossomed with followers such as Ruth Benedict and Alfred Kroeber by the middle of the 
twentieth century. The postulate of “cultural variety” was their enduring and fundamental 
theme. In the 1970s, Clifford Geertz gave a distinctive hermeneutical twist to the sub-discipline 
(Geertz was a student of Talcott Parsons, and thus his anthropological framework was also 
informed by sociology). Instead of a focus on, for example (and especially), forms of cultural 
materialism, Geertz argued instead that: 
[b]elieving, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not 
an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.21  
In particular, these “webs of significance” are deposited in cultural symbols, which are to 
be deciphered through “thick description” (which Ricœur, in his appropriation of Geertz, 
understands as a form of Weberian Verstehen sociology).22  
In the current context, the significance of cultural anthropology lies in its emphasis on the 
articulation of cultural meaning as elemental to the human condition, especially in its collective, 
that is, social aspect. As such, cultural anthropology – and the late twentieth century cultural (or 
culturalist) turn in the human and social sciences, more broadly, challenged the then dominant 
images of society (as, generally speaking, structural and/or functionalist). Culture was no longer 
simply seen as one variable among others, but as a central and relatively autonomous element of 
social formation. Within sociology, this has been termed the shift from the “weak program” of the 
“sociology of culture” to the “strong program” of “cultural sociology.” Jeffrey C. Alexander, for 
whom Geertz was also a central intellectual source, has pioneered the best known version of this 
approach. As Alexander writes in his programmatic essay “The Strong Program in Cultural 
Sociology”: 
The fault line at the heart of current debates lies between “cultural sociology” and the 
“sociology of culture.” To believe in the possibility of a “cultural sociology” is to subscribe 
to the idea that every action, no matter how instrumental, reflexive or coerced vis-à-vis its 
external environments […] is embedded to some extent in a horizon of affect and 
meaning. […] When described in the folk idiom of positivism, one could say that the more 
traditional “sociology of culture” approach treats culture as a dependent variable, 
whereas in “cultural sociology” it is an “independent variable” that possesses a relative 
autonomy in shaping actions and institutions, providing inputs every bit as vital as more 
material or instrumental forces.23 
The present writer would take issue with a number of Alexander’s contentions but his 
central argument regarding the relative autonomy of culture (as cultural meaning) in the 
formation of social life remains crucial. Ricœur, too, takes on board the autonomy of culture, for 
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example, in more than one place he approvingly quotes Geertz’s understanding of “the 
autonomous process of symbolic formulation” as an essential aspect of social life.24 
I have briefly sketched Ricœur’s shifting reception of Cassirer’s understanding of the 
symbolic, and have linked it to a concomitant shift in his own understanding of cultural meaning. 
Borrowing from Alexander, we may call this the shift from a “weak” program of the 
hermeneutics of culture to a “strong” program of cultural hermeneutics. In the aforementioned 
passage in Time and Narrative, Ricœur links his new understanding of symbolic meaning to 
Geertz and the symbolic mediation of action. Ricœur finds support in Geertz’s approach for his 
own understanding of action as symbolically mediated, but indicates that Marx’s notion of a 
“language of real social life” provides the greater intellectual impetus.25 Although Ricœur’s 
engagement with Marx (via Althusser and Geertz, in particular) clarified and deepened the 
meaning and scope of his cultural turn, the shift emerges a few years earlier in his thought. In 
what follows, I propose to hermeneutically reconstruct key aspects of this move.  
What were the key intellectual sources and contexts behind this shift? The period in 
question stretches from the mid- to late 1960s to the mid-1970s. Three central lines of debate can 
be identified in Ricœur’s thought at that time (and extend back to the 1950s). These include: first, 
his ongoing engagement with Husserl’s phenomenological reduction grounded in the 
development of his own project; second, his engagement with psychoanalysis; and third, his 
response to various challenges perceived on the intellectual scene in the late 1960s. For example, 
his hermeneuticization of phenomenology takes the more specific form of the rethinking of the 
symbolic, which was a topical discussion in the mid-late 1960s and its structuralist environment. 
Here Ricœur was active on two fronts. On the one hand, he critiqued the structuralist utopia of a 
generalized semiotics; he wanted instead a different view of the symbolic, one that was not 
absorbable into a general theory of science. On the other hand, he was simultaneously moving 
away from, or, at least, reconceptualising his earlier understanding of his “middle” definition of 
symbols as the specific domain of the hermeneutic project.26 All this happened through 
engagement with particular thinkers, although sometimes indirectly. As we shall see, these 
included Cassirer via Goodman; Lévi-Strauss and Saussure; Althusser, and Marxian thought 
more generally as a critical source. In the background, the hermeneutics of suspicion and 
appropriation were being furthered. In the next section, we begin to investigate his rethinking of 
the phenomenological reduction, especially in relation to the symbolic function, and its 
hermeneutic consequences.  
2. The Phenomenological Reduction and the Symbolic Function 
As with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jan Patočka, Ricœur’s phenomenology is premised 
on a critical engagement with both Husserl and Heidegger. Each of these third generation 
phenomenologists critiqued Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness but also found innovative 
ways of appropriating important parts of the Husserlian legacy in conjunction with a distinctive 
take on the meaning of Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world. Johann Arnason has termed this 
a shift towards “post-transcendental phenomenology.”27 In Ricœur’s case, his critical engagement 
with Husserlian idealism and (post)Heideggerian phenomenology incorporated a rearticulation 
of the phenomenological reduction; this also took place as part of his critical engagement with 
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structuralism and Freudian psychoanalysis. This is evident in, for example, his 1967 essay, “The 
Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology.”28 Ricœur’s reappraisal of the 
phenomenological reduction – coupled with his critical engagement with Lévi-Strauss’s 
articulation of the “symbolic function” as part of his linguistic turn – provides the central impetus 
towards his shift to a general theory of culture (especially as it relates to the trans-subjective 
aspect of social life).29  
In “The Question of the Subject,” Ricœur continued to reflect on a range of converging 
problematics, including phenomenological idealism, structuralism, and Freudian psychoanalysis. 
In so doing, new considerations emerged in his thought. As mentioned, my particular interest in 
the essay concerns Ricœur’s rethinking of the phenomenological reduction, especially in relation 
to his critical reappropriation of the structuralist understanding of the “symbolic function.”30 
Before proceeding further, a brief note on “the reduction” is warranted. Ricœur’s engagement 
with Husserl’s unceasing reflections on the reduction was both enduring and complex.31 In his 
appendix to Bréhier, Ricœur understands Husserl’s cogito as continuing “the transcendental of 
Kant, the originary of Hume, and the doubt and cogito of Descartes.”32 Husserl used the 
reduction itself “long before it was reflected upon.”33 Ricœur identifies a consistent tendency in 
Husserl to combine two understandings of phenomenology and distinguishes between 
“methodological” and “doctrinal” idealism in Husserl’s thought. The latter was the result on 
Husserl’s “metaphysical decision about the ultimate sense of reality and exceeds the 
methodological prudence by which consciousness is only interrogated” in Ideas II, which were 
further radicalized in the Cartesian Meditations,34 which formed a core part of Ricœur’s critique of 
Husserl. Husserl’s later work saw the “progressive abandonment” of idealism; the life-world was 
prior to the reduction and became the irreducible in his thought.35 Husserl’s articulation of the 
lifeworld also indicated an increasing preoccupation with history, a concern with which the 
transcendental reduction was meant to eliminate.36 Ricœur’s own understanding of the reduction 
is not always clearly visible, as he approaches it indirectly via his reconstruction of Husserl. 
Generally speaking, however, the reduction in Husserl is a way of extracting the subject from the 
world, which then goes on to reveal it as the creator of the world; in Ricœur it becomes – as in 
different ways, in Patočka and Merleau-Ponty – a way of gaining access to a field of meaning that 
connects the subject to the world. Unlike Husserl, Ricœur held that meanings were not solely 
produced by the subject of consciousness. The subject does not constitute the world. Instead, the 
object (the world, understood in a phenomenological not natural scientific sense, and more 
properly as “trans-objective” not “objective”) also “intends” meaning toward the subject. 
Ricœur’s own approach to the reduction did not accept Husserl’s idealism and would seem to 
cautiously advocate for a “methodological idealism.” What is distinctive in Ricœur is the 
emphatic linguistic turn in the 1960s that links up with culture and the trans-subjective, but also 
the determination to keep the subject alive in that context; hence the emphasis on (hermeneutic) 
speech/discourse over (phenomenological) language.  
In “The Question of the Subject,” Ricœur adverts to three core theses of phenomenology: 
meaning as the most comprehensive category; the subject as the bearer of meaning; the reduction 
which allows the subject as the bearer of meaning to emerge (as found in chronological order in 
Logical Investigations).37 However, the phenomenological reduction is the most important, as it 
discloses a field of meaning and the subject as both co-creator and recipient of that meaning. It is 
through the reduction that “every question about being” is transmuted into “a question about the 
 On Ricœur’s Shift from a Hermeneutics of Culture to a Culture of Hermeneutics 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 6, No 2 (2015)    ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2015.312    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
136 
 
meaning of being.” This move – and any further step – is a crucial first stage in any rethinking of 
phenomenology, and raises questions about further moves.38 As Ricœur observes it is “in and 
through reduction [that] every being comes to be described as a phenomenon, as appearance, 
thus as a meaning to be made explicit.”39 Two things are important to note here for Ricœur: First, 
the reduction itself is irreducible to an idealist interpretation. Second, it is through the reduction 
that our relation to the world becomes apparent. The three theses – in order of their founding – 
then become: the reduction to the subject and then to meaning “as the universal mediation 
between the subject and the world.”40 Ricœur’s approach to “the meaning of meaning” avoids 
both the structuralist reduction and the anthropocentric turn that can result from a rethinking of 
transcendental phenomenology. (A rethinking of phenomenology is not synonymous with the 
turn from transcendental phenomenology to an anthropocentric perspective; but the latter is one 
kind of rethinking of phenomenology. Ricœur takes note of it and learns from it, but does not 
identify with it.) As I argue, Ricœur’s own engagement with – and rearticulation of – 
transcendental phenomenology took a different path in the late 1960s. In the next sentence, 
Ricœur claims phenomenology as a “generalized theory of language,”41 which evokes his 
understanding of Humboldt’s approach to language as the “relation between man and world.”42 
Meaning fundamentally emerges in language, and mediates between anthropos and world. 
Phenomenologically speaking, “language ceases to be an activity, a function, an operation among 
others: it is identified with the entire signifying milieu, with the complex of signs thrown like a 
net over our field of perception, our action, our life.”43 It is not one precondition among others, 
but a meta-precondition of social life.44  
Ricœur goes on to discuss the ways in which structuralist linguistics challenges idealist 
phenomenology, as its notion of signification is placed in a different field from the subject’s 
intentions.45 This involves three aspects: the dichotomy of language and speech; the 
subordination of diachrony to synchrony; and, third, the reduction of “substantial aspects of 
language… to formal aspects.”46 Language is understood as a system of signs defined only by 
difference, and without signification, that has no externality, i.e. it is a closed system of signs. But 
it is this “specific negativity” that brings the phenomenological reduction into relief: “The 
linguistic sign can stand for something only if it is not the thing.”47 The reduction “renders 
thematic what was only operative, and thereby makes meaning appear as meaning.”48 Through this 
engagement with structuralism, Ricœur shows that signification becomes more distant from the 
subject than is the case in idealist phenomenology. 
To provide an adequate response to the structuralist challenge, Ricœur draws on the 
resources of hermeneutics as well as phenomenology. His semantic theory of discourse provides 
new forms for “meaning” and “language” – but he does not substitute one (phenomenological) 
pair for the other (structuralist pair); rather, they operate on different levels. The two levels are 
conceived in interplay: the semiotic sign, organized by difference, is transferred to the semantic 
world “by means of reference”;49 this can provisionally be called the process of representation; 
that is, following Benveniste, the semantic function of representing the real by signs.50 Here, 
“language is articulated for the purpose of the signifying or representative function.”51 In 
reference to Merleau-Ponty’s “speaking subject,” and of relevance for our succeeding discussion, 
Ricœur observes:  
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The passage through language restores to the analysis of speech its properly linguistic 
character, which can be preserved only if one seeks it in the direct extension of the 
“gesture.” It is, on the contrary, as the semantic realization of the semiological order that 
speech, by an inverse reaction, causes human gesture to appear as signifying, at least 
inchoately. A philosophy of expression and signification which has not passed through 
these semiological and logical mediations is condemned to stop short of the properly 
semantic level.52  
It is only by traversing these (semiotic) levels that signification in its fullness appears at 
the semantic level of discourse. Ricœur wants to show that the semiotic order is virtual. It 
provides the conditions of “articulation” without which language would not exist, but it is not yet 
language in its signifying aspect; it has no referent. Discourse actualizes language; it is spoken by 
a subject and refers to the world. Thus there are two entwined orders: organization and 
realization, or, from another perspective, system and event.53 From this, Ricœur concludes that 
the positing of the subject needs to be accomplished within language, more particularly in the 
“occurrence of discourse, that is, in the act by which the potential system of language becomes 
the actual event of speech.”54 In an important move – and leaning on Benveniste – Ricœur thus 
argues that the subject asserts itself in the move from language to discourse. Overall, Ricœur’s 
rethinking of the reduction by way of the symbolic function and its links to language are 
becoming clear. 
The problematic of signification was a shared problematic for structuralism and 
phenomenology. It challenged Ricœur to articulate a new response to the first question of 
phenomenology: “What does signifying signify?” and to rethinking signification as a theory of 
signs from a phenomenological perspective that incorporates a linguistic aspect.55 Following the 
“long detour of signs,” he sought the reduction “among the necessary conditions of signifying 
relations, of the symbolic function as such,”56 where the reduction will appear as:  
[the] “transcendental” of language, the possibility for man to be something other than a 
nature among natures, the possibility for him to be related to the real by designating it 
through signs. This reinterpretation of reduction, in connection with a philosophy of 
language, is perfectly homogeneous with the conception of phenomenology as the general 
theory of meaning, as the theory of generalized language.57 
Ricœur pursued this thread further primarily via Lévi-Strauss. He agreed with Lévi-
Strauss that language, unlike knowledge (or a “science of signs”), could only have come into 
being instantaneously, and thus the symbolic function was to be understood as a condition of 
possibility: “What is at issue here is the very birth of man to the order of signs.”58 
But in what sense is the linguisticality of the symbolic function transcendental? Here I 
note that Ricœur’s usage of the term (as in the above citation) is in quotation marks, which 
indicates that it is not to be taken in a strict, Kantian sense, but is rather more indicative of the fact 
that, at that particular stage, he was still thinking his way through the argument, and 
experimenting with terminology. Ricœur’s new approach to the reduction as “transcendental” 
could be compared to Marcel Gauchet’s project of a “transcendental socio-anthropology,” where 
the transcendental is understood as a “precondition” that emerges in history. This is also in line 
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with Ricœur’s later thought (from the 1970s) which framed things more in terms of an “open 
dialectic” rather than as a “dichotomy.” In this vein, he wrote that “[t]he old polemic between 
explanation and understanding can then be reconsidered anew, in a less dichotomous and more 
dialectical sense, now possessing a broader field of application, including not only the text but history and 
praxis as well.”59 What we see here is the beginning of a shift from the symbolic understood as the 
transcendental origin of society, to, in Charles Taylor’s terms a “weak transcendental” that can no 
longer be said to be totally outside of history and time. As Ricœur writes in a slightly later essay: 
“It is in discourse that the symbolic function of language is actualized”; it is in the hermeneutic 
domain of historical life that the phenomenological preconditions are realized.60 We can see that 
Ricœur grafts the notion of the “symbolic function” onto the phenomenological reduction in 
novel ways. As we know, Ricœur accepts the critique of the philosophy of consciousness, but 
nonetheless sought to revive a hermeneutical-phenomenological notion of the self that is not 
subject to the philosophy of consciousness (ultimately via discourse as text). In so doing, he took 
up the notion of signification, of signifying relations: the “symbolic function as such.”61  
Following this path, Ricœur agrees with Lévi-Strauss that the symbolic function is not 
reducible to semiology. The reduction marks the “beginning of signifying life”62 and the symbolic 
function “a condition of possibility.”63 He goes on to quote – and agree with – Lévi-Strauss’s 
critique of Mauss:  
The two beginnings, thus understood in their radicalness, are one and the same beginning 
if, following Lévi-Strauss’s remark, the symbolic function is the origin and not the result 
of social life: “Mauss still believes it possible to develop a sociological theory of 
symbolism, while obviously what must be sought is the symbolic origin of society.”64  
These three aspects form the turning point towards his general theory of culture: the 
symbolic origin of society, the symbolic function as the beginning of signifying life. Later we will 
see a fourth aspect: the actualization of the symbolic function in hermeneutic discourse. 
In bridging the passage from “sign” to “signification,” from “language” to “discourse,” 
from the “semiological” to the “semantic,” Ricœur demolishes the presuppositions of an 
“objectivist” approach (that is both worldless and subjectless) to the actualization of signification, 
and instead develops an understanding of the subject and world disclosure as reciprocal. As 
Ricœur argues, the symbolic function includes the capacity to put all exchanges (including 
exchanges of signs) under an overarching rule, “thus under an anonymous principle which 
transcends subjects.”65 More importantly for Ricœur it is the capacity to actualize the rule into an 
“event,” of which discourse is the “prototype,” where, a key aspect of the symbol in its social (not 
mathematical) variant “implies a rule of recognition between subjects.” But he goes further, 
following in this instance Ortigues rather than Lévi-Strauss, where the fullness of the reduction is 
an understanding of society that involves a “return to the self by way of its other which makes 
the transcendental no longer a kind of sign but a kind of signification.”66  
Even though Ricœur consistently emphasizes the intersubjective aspect of the social as a 
critique of the “anonymous” and “subjectless” approach of structuralism, the overarching point 
is that the symbolic function constitutes the social dimension of the human condition. This is put 
even more clearly a few years later when he draws again on Lévi-Strauss’s critique of Mauss: In 
discussing the “constitutive character” of the social imaginary and the “most elementary level” at 
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which it (and specifically, ideology) operates, Ricœur notes, “As Lévi-Strauss strongly asserts in 
his introduction to the work of Marcel Mauss, symbolism is not an effect of society, rather society 
is an effect of symbolism.”67 Here we also note the shift in terminology, from “the symbolic” to 
“symbolism”: these have slightly different meanings, and point, in my view, to the interlacing of 
phenomenology (and the “transcendental” symbolic) and hermeneutics (and the symbolism of 
discourse and history) at the very core of society’s self-institution in his thought. 
As it is often misunderstood, opening a parenthesis to clarify the trans-subjective 
dimension of the human condition seems relevant at this juncture. It is possible – and, in the 
present writer’s view, desirable – to hermeneutically reconstruct a “trans-subjective” aspect to 
Ricœur’s understanding of sociality (including the symbolic function that incorporates the 
anonymous aspect of society) but without, unlike structuralism, negating subjectivity nor 
sidelining meaning. In so doing, it would connect Ricœur’s understanding of the social imaginary 
as both cultural and social (and political, although that would is not as central in this context). 
This would be important to pursue, as Ricœur’s rethinking of the reduction and the 
linguistification of the symbolic calls for a greater understanding of the place of the trans-
subjective – this broadest and most fundamental mode of sociality – for the reduction. This would 
simultaneously mean that signification would be irreducible to the subject (or to 
intersubjectivity), but must be thought of as the interplay of subjective, trans-subjective, and 
trans-objective contexts. This is especially the case when concerning the practical world of action 
(which would also include not only culture but also “movement” from a trans-subjective aspect). 
(To make this argument on the basis of Ricœur’s thought would require extensive hermeneutical 
reconstruction, however, which is clearly beyond the scope of the present essay.)68  
The trans-subjective dimension of the human condition can be seen in, for example, the 
distinction between “the imaginary” as a region of social existence, and “the imagination” as a 
singular human faculty. It refers to the level of human sociality that is anonymous, and is the 
precondition for subject-selves acting meaningfully in intersubjective contexts. Castoriadis has 
elucidated the trans-subjective level of the human condition very clearly, although he frames it in 
social-ontological terms. On his account, the trans-subjective is to be understood as the mode of 
being of the social-historical as the anonymous collective of society. It is always-already 
unmotivated, thoroughly historical, and irreducible to the intersubjective level of sociality. It 
appears as cultural significations that are embedded in (but not exhausted by) institutions – 
understood here in the broadest sense – and thereby in patterns of power that alter themselves in, 
through, and as time (and concrete temporal forms). In the historical domain proper, the trans-
subjective context of the social-historical consists of the interplay of instituted patterns and 
instituting irruptions of cultural meaning, social power, and collective movement that are both 
in-the-world and opening-onto-the-world. Castoriadis’s use of the term “institution” is important to 
note. It draws on Merleau-Ponty’s elucidation of “institution” as a critique of the Husserlian 
notion of “constitution,” on the one hand, and emphasizes the properly societal element of the 
human condition as the social-historical, on the other. In phenomenology, the trans-subjective 
dimension has been likened to Heidegger’s “Das Man.” Although the notion of “trans-
subjectivity” shares with “Das Man” an anonymous level of sociality, the trans-subjective, in the 
way that it is meant here, does not refer to an inauthentic mode of being; it is better understood 
as meta-normative. Some, such as Habermas, have criticized Castoriadis for losing sight of the 
subject in the “hurly burly” of anonymous sociality. But the subject is neither reduced to nor 
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submerged in the anonymous collective; rather, trans-subjective contexts both open up and limit 
possible varieties of subjectivity within cultural and civilizational complexes.  
To return to Ricœur’s articulation of culture: The key to understanding Ricœur’s shift to a 
strong theory of culture begins with his reformulation of the phenomenological reduction in the 
mid- to late 1960s that was de facto operational by 1970-1971, in as much as Ricœur had placed the 
idea of the sociality of the symbolic, and the symbolic constitution of society firmly in the centre 
of his hermeneutic-phenomenological framework. In brief, he always rejected the notion that the 
phenomenological reduction was a subtraction from reality “as the metaphor of the parenthesis 
let us believe,”69 no longer looking at the “things themselves” – absolute and in itself but instead 
at their meaning for us, as did Husserl, but with Ricœur now adopting a decidedly more relative 
rather than absolute position. With the reduction, an “empire of meaning (sens)” appears, an 
appearance for humankind. We take our gaze away from the “natural world” and towards the 
thesis of the meaning of the world. If in effect the reduction is not the loss of something, nor its 
subtraction, but to take distance from what are not only things but signs, meaning, significations, 
“the phenomenological reduction marks the birth of the symbolic function in general.”70  
Ricœur’s insights into the textuality of action “the gradual re-inscription of the theory of 
texts within the theory of action” – along with his deepening hermeneuticization of 
phenomenology, his new understanding of a semantics of reference, and his grappling with the 
ideological imaginary further refined his cultural framework for articulating the human 
condition.71 We discuss these aspects in the following section. 
3. The Social Imaginary: Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics  
Ricœur understands phenomenology and hermeneutics to be in perpetual interplay – the 
problematic of the “meaning of meaning” is their common ground. As we have seen the 
phenomenological reduction opens onto hermeneutic operations. This enduring intertwining is 
also apparent in the hermeneutical sphere of life, as seen in his understanding of the structuration 
of being-in-the-world in relation to the ideological imaginary. For Ricœur, the most “fundamental 
phenomenological presupposition of a philosophy of interpretation is that every questioning 
concerning any sort of ‘being’ is a question about the meaning of that ‘being’.”72 In turn, 
hermeneutics becomes a philosophical and not just exegetical hermeneutics and addresses itself 
to “the lingual condition ‘the Sprachlichkeit’ – of all experience,” but it goes further and must 
subordinate Sprachlichkeit “to the experience which comes to language;”73 that is, it “refers the 
linguistic order back to the [phenomenological] structure of experience.”74 Hermeneutics has its 
own domains beyond phenomenology proper, but of primary interest here is the domain of 
historical experience as part of particular historical traditions. The phenomenological act of 
signifying a “lived experience” is also a hermeneutical act, an act of signifying a lived experience 
that belongs to an historical tradition (which from the 1970s, Ricœur understood as mediated by 
texts).75  
Here we can see ideology already at work. First, as Ricœur has noted, he employs the 
Gadamerian term “belonging” to signify “being-in-the-world”; the term “belonging” emphasizes 
its hermeneutical element.76 It is a “primordial relation of belonging […] without which there 
would be no relation to the historical as such.”77 Simultaneously, the hermeneutic aspect is also 
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phenomenological, in that it signifies the existential structures – the structure of anticipation, of 
“pre-understanding” – that are constitutive of our being-in-the-world.78 These existential structures 
precede language – it is these “experiences” that language brings to life and to meaning – or 
better, to the fullness of expression. (Let us recall Ricœur’s interpretation of Cassirer in Time and 
Narrative mentioned above, of the symbolic “articulating experience.”) Yet these structures are 
not a-cultural or a-historical; they emerge as historical meaning as the most elementary aspect of 
meaning. We think through and with these structures of existence in-the-world, which emerge as a 
relation of belonging to a “history, a class, nature, culture, etc.,” but consequently upon which we 
cannot ever fully reflect.79 This is the work of the social imaginary in its primitive, ideological 
layer in its cultural rendering of the world.  
But this, too, I would suggest, comprises a plurality of levels: the most basic corresponds 
to “certain fundamental human experiences [that] make up an immediate symbolism that 
presides over the most primitive metaphorical order. This original symbolism seems to adhere to 
the most immutable human manner of being in the world” (such as cardinal direction, terrestrial 
localization, elements of such fire, wind, etc).80 Then we come to the imaginary – or ideological – 
layers of the human condition in-the-world, properly speaking. There are at least two of these: 
first, the work of the symbolic function in the institution of society, and, second, the 
interpretation of this symbolic bond in historical patterns of symbolism. These latter layers are 
not explicitly delineated as such by Ricœur but are implicitly indicated in the following passage: 
“Ideology is an unsurpassable phenomenon of social existence insofar as social reality always has 
a symbolic constitution and incorporates an interpretation, in images and representations, of the 
social bond itself.”81 The interplay of the phenomenological and hermeneutical aspects is here 
apparent. The ideological imaginary renders the underdetermined horizon of the world as the 
world for a particular collective ─ these are the anticipatory structures of being-in-the-world as the 
sphere of “belonging.” These need not always be explicit as this hermeneutical sphere of “world 
articulation” is operative not thematic. We think from these anticipatory structures, not about 
them, and we can never fully posit them absolutely, as their historical antecedents are never 
given in itself;82 instead, as hermeneutic, they always involve an interpretation, and, further, 
operate such that we always find ourselves “in the middle” rather than at any origin or end 
point.83 This is in line with some of Ricœur’s writings at the time of a language – or a “phrasing” 
[phrasé] of the world that would be a kind of “interior language” to human modalities such as 
action,84 or an as an implicit symbolism of action.85 This would imply that they are inseparable 
from – yet go beyond – an explicit articulation by language.86 Simultaneously, emerging from the 
movement and activity of the ideological imaginary of the anticipatory structuration of the world, 
a more explicitly articulated interpretation of the social bond as symbolically mediated, in 
images, narratives, ritual etc., that integrates and identifies a social collective as that particular 
collective comes to the fore. These two layers – the symbolic institution of society and its further 
articulation in and as concrete forms of symbolic activity and forms that are particular to that 
social collective – as well as the symbolic mediation between them – disclose/create “possible 
modes of being, as symbolic dimensions of our being-in-the-world.”87 Not only are the structures of 
society symbolic to its core, but also the structures of the human condition in-the-world are 
symbolic: both emerge from the activity of the social imaginary operating at different levels. 
This would also make sense in light of Ricœur’s discussion of Althusser in the Lectures, 
where he discusses the shifting layers of the “imaginary.” I quote the passage in question in full:  
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On this basis the imaginary features of ideology must be qualified and improved. Here I 
raise two points. First what is distorted is not reality as such, not the real condition of 
existence, but our relation to this condition of existence. We are not far from a concept of 
being-in-the-world; it is our relation to reality which is distorted. “Now I can return to a 
thesis which I have already advanced: it is not their real conditions of existence, their real 
world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to 
those conditions of existence which is represented to them there.”[88] This leads to a most 
important insight, because what is a relation to the conditions of existence if not already 
an interpretation, something symbolically mediated. To speak of our relation to the world 
requires a symbolic structure. My main argument, therefore, is that if we do not have from 
the start a symbolic structure to our existence, then nothing can be distorted. As Althusser 
himself observes: “it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies all the 
imaginary distortion that we can observe […] in all ideology”[89] We are not far from a 
complete reversal in our approach to the problem of the imaginary. We could not 
understand that there are distorted images if there were not first a primary imaginary 
structure of our being in the world underlying even the distortions. The imaginary 
appears not only in the distorted forms of existence, because it is already present in the 
relation which is distorted. The imaginary is constitutive of our relation to the world. One 
of my main questions, then, is whether this does not imply before the distorting function 
of imagination a constitutive function of imagination.90  
It is tempting to bring in Castoriadis’s understanding of the imaginary element in its 
interplay with the symbolic element at this point. This would correlate to Ricœur’s 
understanding of the symbolic function as symbolic institution of the world (this is the 
“imaginary element, as such,” for Castoriadis), and its simultaneous but distinct layer of concrete 
symbolic interpretation. The two are in constant interplay. Prior to his ontological turn in the 
early 1970s, Castoriadis published an important essay in 1964-5 called “The Imaginary and the 
Institution: A First Approach” that focussed on the interconnections of imaginary and symbolic 
elements in the self-institution of society. There he argued that the imaginary element – as social 
imaginary significations ─ was the precondition for the symbolic webs of the social world.91 Not 
only are the structures of society symbolic to its core, but so, too, are the structures of the human 
condition in-the-world: both emerge from the activity of the social imaginary operating at different 
levels. 
Two final points are worth observing, each in its own way closes the hermeneutical circle 
we are presently traversing only to open onto a new one. First, I began this essay by noting that 
Ricœur’s turn to a general theory of culture culminated in his engagement with Geertz in the 
Ideology and Utopia Lectures. The point of the lecture on Geertz was to emphasize the way in which 
symbolic systems mediate action, and thus conclusively to demonstrate that ideology and praxis 
are not opposed but rather that ideology in its integrative aspect is the ground of praxis. Ricœur 
notes that “Marx himself suggests by his allusion to the ‘language of life’ that here must be a 
place or stage in which praxis itself implies some symbolic mediation […] symbolization [is] 
constitutive of action as such.”92 But we can go further than this. 
 At play, here, I suggest, is the symbolic function and the interconnections of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics reconfigured into the practical domain of life as action. We 
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note again that that for Ricœur (hermeneutic) discourse actualizes the (phenomenological 
preconditions of the) symbolic function of language that the phenomenological reduction brings 
into relief, and note, too, that Ricœur explicitly extends this to practical life.93 Ricœur observes, 
moreover, that the structural model can be generalized to all social phenomena that can be 
understood semiotically (that is the general relation between code and message, signifier and 
signified, etc):  
Inasmuch as the semiological model holds, the semiotic or symbolic function, that is, the 
function of substituting signs for things and of representing things by means of signs, 
appears to be more than a mere effect in social life. It is its very foundation. We should 
have to say, according to this generalized function of the semiotic, not only that the 
symbolic function is social but that social reality is fundamentally symbolic.94 
In his Lecture on Geertz, Ricœur has emphasized Geertz’s semiotic approach to culture 
and symbols,95 his use of “cultural codes” and “templates” to inform social action: 
We have to articulate our social experience in the same way that we have to articulate our 
perceptual experience. Just as models in scientific language allow us to see how things 
look, allow us to see things as this or that, in the same way our social templates articulate 
our social roles, articulate our position in society as this or that. And perhaps it is not 
possible to go behind or below this primitive structuration.96 
But although there is a “primitive hermeneutic layer of praxis,”97 that is, although the 
symbolic mediation of action takes place on the historical level – on the hermeneutical plane – it 
also refers us back to the phenomenological milieu, to what we might call the “primitive 
phenomenological layer of praxis”:  
Indeed, I have never ceased to base the semantic analysis of reference upon the conviction 
that discourse never exists simply for its own glory but that it attempts, in all its usages, to 
carry an experience to language, a manner of inhabiting and of being-in-the-world, which 
precedes it and demands to be said […] Now, in a philosophy that was increasingly seen 
as a practical philosophy, acting constitutes the core of what, in Heideggerian and post-
Heideggerian ontology, is called being-in-the-world, or, in a more striking fashion, the act 
of inhabiting.98 
Thus the interplay of hermeneutics and phenomenology is reconfigured on several levels 
in the realm of social action.  
One of Ricœur’s central aims in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia was to show that 
praxis/action and ideology were not opposed but interconnected. As is well known, he concludes 
that ideology as symbolic and integrative underlies praxis as the “activity of real social life.” This 
comes to the fore in his lectures on Marx and Althusser, where Ricœur takes up Marx’s notion of 
an anthropology of “real social life” and the “language of real life” – the language of praxis – to 
reinforce the symbolic dimension (and only on that basis, could possible ideological “distortion” 
occur) of the human condition in the practical sphere. We cannot go beyond ideology: “For how 
could illusions and fantasies have any historical efficacy if ideology did not have a mediating role 
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incorporated in the most elementary social bond, as the latter’s symbolic constitution in the sense 
of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss? Hence we cannot speak of a pre-ideological or non-ideological 
activity.”99 
This brings us to our final point. I suggested at the beginning of this essay that Ricœur’s 
changing reception of Cassirer encapsulated his turn to a general – or anthropological – theory of 
culture. In so doing, I noted that part of his reception of Cassirer occurred indirectly as a result of 
his engagement with Nelson Goodman’s work. Here I would like to suggest that Ricœur’s 
encounter with Nelson Goodman’s thought helped refine his turn to a general theory of culture, 
in both its phenomenological and hermeneutical aspects and that this happened most likely in 
the early to mid-1970s. Two of Goodman’s works are of importance here: his earlier work 
Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols and his now classic text, Ways of Worldmaking, 
which Ricœur reviewed (and interestingly for much of the review discussed the earlier book 
Languages of Art).100 Goodman features in Ricœur’s thought generally as a way of thinking 
through metaphorical reference (in Study 7 of The Rule of Metaphor, Ricœur characterizes 
Goodman’s approach as a “denotative theory of metaphor”),101 which appeared to Ricœur as 
“capable of taking up under new auspices [his] old problem of the symbol, to which [he] had 
accorded without discussion the function of detecting the deepest recesses of experience, 
metaphor now appearing in the semantic framework of the symbol.”102 In the important essay, 
“Imagination in Discourse and in Action,” published a year before Ways of Worldmaking, Ricœur 
mentions in passing, in referring to Goodman’s work of the icon, that his own work on the 
imagination “links up with the theory of generalized symbols in Nelson Goodman’s The 
Languages of Art: all symbols – of art and of language – have the same referential claim to ‘remake 
reality’.”103 The notion of “generalized symbols” is a crucial context for understanding Ricœur’s 
shift to a general theory of culture. Although he only mentions it in “Imagination in Discourse 
and in Action,” he discussed it at greater length (or rather, he discussed Goodman’s 
interpretation of it) in his earlier Rule of Metaphor (in particular, Study 7), where Goodman’s 
theory of metaphor is inserted into the theory of symbolic systems: “The universality of the 
referential function is guaranteed by the universality of the organizing power of language and, 
more generally, of symbolic systems […] symbolic systems ‘make’ and ‘remake’ the world.”104 
Here it is of less relevance to go into Ricœur’s argument about the ultimate difference between 
“reference” and “denotation” when it comes to symbols; instead it is important to note the 
overlap between symbolic systems and metaphor.105 
The interplay between symbolic systems and metaphor highlights the interconnectedness 
of the ideological and utopian imaginaries and their shared participation in the creative 
imagination. Ricœur’s approach to the social imaginary can be said to be situated at the 
intersection of his various approaches to meaning – his earlier work on the double meaning of 
symbols, his expansion of the hermeneutic approach to texts and action; the theory of metaphor 
as creative reference to the world; and his later approach to narrative. Although he does argue 
that both the ideological and utopian imaginaries are creative, overall, however, it seems clear 
that the ideological imaginary appears more closely linked to the “bound” nature of “symbols” – 
and the reproductive imagination, whilst the utopian imaginary appears more closely aligned 
with the semantic creativity of metaphoric reference, with “the function of fiction in shaping 
reality,” and the productive imagination.106 Nonetheless, from Goodman’s thought, as we have 
seen, Ricœur takes the idea that “symbolic systems ‘make’ and ‘remake’ the world.”107 For 
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Ricœur, the rhetorical aspect of ideology links it to the creative aspect of metaphor, and shows us 
the interplay of creative and reproductive aspects of the ideological imaginary. In the Geertz 
lecture he tells us: “If the rhetoric of ideology proceeds like, say, that of metaphor, then the 
relation between the ideology and its so-called real basis may be compared to the relation of 
reference that a metaphorical utterance entertains with the situation it redescribes.”108 However, it 
can only emerge against an always already symbolically configured background of signification 
as the world horizon (itself the primitive layer of ideology) as the anticipatory structure of a 
particular social collective. Thus this involves an open dialectic between “invention” and 
“disclosure.” In this way, as he notes in his review of Ways of Worldmaking: 
Contrary to the first alternative [regarding world versions v versions of the world], the 
world may be more than each version without being apart from it. It is the very 
experience of making that yields that of discovering. And discovering is to confront the 
opacity of the world. The world is included – excluded as the horizon of each intentional 
aiming. It is not something to which versions refer, but that out of which or against the 
background of which, versions refer.109 
In lieu of a conclusion 
I began this essay by arguing that Ricœur’s turn to a strong theory of culture – his shift 
from a hermeneutics of culture to a cultural hermeneutics – was encapsulated in his reception of 
Cassirer, and culminated in his engagement with Geertz in the Ideology and Utopia Lectures. I 
contended that Ricœur’s turn to culture involved a rethinking of the interplay of specific 
phenomenological and hermeneutical problematics that focuses on responding to “the meaning 
of meaning” as their common ground. His rethinking of the phenomenological reduction in light 
of the symbolic function (and its linguisticality and sociality) was central to this endeavour, as 
was the hermeneutical aspect of “belonging” to an historical tradition as the anticipatory 
structures of being-in-the-world. Several layers of the ideological imaginary were disclosed as part 
of the philosophical anthropology of real social life, as was its connection to the utopian 
imaginary, that is, the productive imagination, properly speaking. The interlacing of 
phenomenological and hermeneutic aspects – especially centred on the symbolic function – that 
were discussed in “The Question of the Subject” were reconfigured onto the domain of practical 
life, where action was understood to hermeneutically actualize symbolic systems, whilst referring 
back to ideological structures of being-in-the-world, on the one hand, but opening onto new worlds 
(or onto “counter-worlds” in the case of the utopian imaginary), on the other. 
The social sciences have been quicker than philosophy to embrace the cultural turn in the 
strong sense and to explicitly interrogate its implications – especially in relation to the sociality of 
meaning in all its fullness. However, the social sciences have been reticent to explore the other 
aspect of meaning: its world relation. This is apparent in Geertz (and in Ricœur’s discussion of 
Geertz, where the phenomenological problematic of the world is not mentioned). To do so would 
challenge the pre-eminence of broadly social constructionist approaches that are at the core of its 
endeavour. Philosophy – especially in its phenomenological and hermeneutic variants – has 
embraced understandings of meaning that go beyond anthropocentrism: being-in-the-world is the 
most elementary form of meaning. Ricœur’s elucidation of the social imaginary as part of an 
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anthropology of “real social life” foregrounds the complexity of the phenomenological 
problematic of the world and its hermeneutic centrality for understanding the human condition 
in new ways.110 
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